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CHALLENGES FACING JAPANESE STEEL IN 
TODAY'S GLOBAL ECONOMY 
by Yoshitaka Fujitani 
I am happy to hear that you have an interest in the steel industry. In the U.S. few articles 
have appeared in newspapers or magazines about the steel industry in the past decade. In fact, 
since the U.S. steel industry lost its competitiveness and profitability after the 1982 recession, only 
a few people have paid attention to the industry. Wall Street has been interested only in the so-
called high-tech industries and the best and brightest financial businesses. But I want to remind 
you that the steel industry is no longer a smokestack industry. It continues to be a very important 
basic industry, and because it use high technology, it is now a high-tech industry itself. 
These days the steel industry is regaining its press value. Numerous anti-dumping and 
CVD petitions have been filed since 1991. Mini-mill competition has also emerged against 
integrated mills. Big mills regained their competitiveness through intensive restructuring. And, 
last year, profitability was restored through economic recovery. Now once again Wall Street pays 
attention to the industry. Hence U.S. steel makers could obtain financing through public offerings 
to strengthen their balance sheets. Over $5 billion was raised from the market in the past couple 
of years. In addition, Japanese steel involvement in the U.S. steel industry has taken the form of 
joint ventures or equity ownership, investing directly or indirectly over $7 billion since 1984 when 
the U.S. steel industry needed help in modernizing because of lack of financial resources. 
Japanese steel production has surpassed U.S. output since 1982. This shoft in steel output 
leaders occurred against the background of a severe recession in the United States caused by high 
1 
inflation, subsequent high interest and strong dollar policies which were extremely damaging to 
American manufacturing, not only to steel but also to auto production and other areas. The final 
blow, which made the recession even worse, was rising energy costs fueled by the oil crisis. The 
loss of American manufacturing competitiveness was followed by a hollowing-out effect as some 
manufacturers moved off-shore. Since 1982, the U.S. current account has been in deficit. 
American steel makers, along with many other traditional heavy industries, faced major 
challenges and had to undergo severe restructuring. Their workforce has been dramatically 
reduced with the shutdown of obsolete facilities. Some survived as reconstituted mills. 
Modernization of processes, especially continuous casting, contributed to productivity and 
quality, and reduction of white collar office workers cut overhead costs. Over a ten-year period, 
productivity of the U.S. steel industry has caught up to the world-class level and now may even 
surpass that of Japanese steel. 
In the case of Japanese steel, domestic competition for capacity expansion was the main 
strategy up until 1980 since we enjoyed steadily increasing domestic demand as well as the 
opportunity to expand export sales. I believe that if Japanese steel had continued this strategy of 
expansion, it would face excess capacity overnight when a recession hit, or strong competitors 
emerged, or the economic environment, such as the foreign currency situation, changed. 
In Europe, steel makers sought to solve their problems through joint investment or 
collaboration, and this is continuing today. But Japanese steel makers never considered such 
approaches, even at the time of the second oil crisis or during the yen appreciation recession after 
the Plaza Accord in 1985. Instead, Japanese steel makers made individual efforts to rationalize 
and to reduce capacity. 
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Our capacity has been cut from a high of 150 million tons to the current 110 million ton 
level. The workforce of the top 5 steel makers was reduced from 150,000 in 1985 to 90,000 
today. In comparison, the 5 top U.S. integrated mills reduced their workforce from that same 
150,000 in 1985 to 77,000 today. We still have a lifetime employment system by which, for 
example, major steel companies dispatch employees to affiliate companies rather than laying them 
off. About 30% of total employees work for affiliated companies with some 30-40% of their 
wages subsidized by the parent companies. This is obviously a heavy burden on Japanese steel 
companies, although we do not have the added burden of pension or health care costs for retirees 
as U.S. steel companies have. 
Concerning domestic demand trends for Japanese steel, after hitting bottom in 1986, the 
economy quickly adjusted to the yen recession and started recovering through the so-called 
bubble economy which reached its peak in 1990. Actually asset inflation seemed to continue and 
sustain the economic growth. Many in Japan believed the myth that real estate values and stock 
prices would continue to rise. But it was really only a myth. 
When we examine the bubble economy, we find that the balance of asset values (real 
estate, stock, net fixed asset and financial assets) steadily increased from 1970 to 1988 to about 
16 times GDP. There are several reasons: 1) real short-term interest rates (CD 3 month interest -
CPI) were kept low, in the range of 4%, 2) the money supply was kept high, always 10% of the 
growth rate because of the constant increase of household savings to financial institutions, 3) 
dreams of capital stock gains enabled equity financing and bonds with expected total ROI 
(including capital gains) at levels equivalent with U.S. and Europe, although the ROI stock was 
far less than U.S. standards (i.e., less than 1 percent). 
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It is noteworthy to mention that the accumulated current account surplus of Japan from 
1982 through 1993 was $810 billion. But this was not the reason for the bubble economy since 
the long-term capital balance in the same period was actually minus $690 billion, including about 
$350 billion in direct investments overseas. 
During the bubble economy, Japanese steel enjoyed strong domestic demand. We had a 
peak of 110 million tons annual rate of crude steel production toward the end of 1991. The 
sudden collapse of the bubble economy caused domestic demand to fall sharply, and apparent 
consumption of crude steel fell as much as 15 million tons. We could cover about 5 million tons 
through the increase of exports due to the economic growth of Asian countries, maintaining an 
8% range of import penetration. 
Among the current (1994) domestic apparent consumption of 73 million tons, 20% is 
consumed by indirect exports. In this sense, another round of weak dollars and strong yen and 
subsequent manufacturing shifts to Asian countries (i.e., the so-called "hollowing out effects") 
causes concern for Japanese steel. The first round of direct investments of Japanese 
manufacturing took place in 1986, accelerating investment mostly in the United States and 
Europe. I do not call this a "hollowing out effect." Only a few direct investments (about 15%) to 
Asian countries permitted exports back to Japan. 
The second round of direct investments of Japanese manufacturing is now taking place, 
following a strong yen of more than 100 to the U.S. dollar. The objectives of direct investment to 
Asian countries are marketing to those countries and exporting back to the Japanese market 
(27%o). But a horizontal division of manufacturing is also taking place in intra-Asian trade and 
diminishing circumvention trade, such as exports to North America. This phenomenon is really 
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the "hollowing out effect" of Japanese manufacturing. Japanese steel has to follow such changes 
in the economic environment. Exports of Japanese steel companies to Asian countries (except 
China) have increased 50% from 8.9 million tons in 1989 to 12.9 million tons in 1994. We are 
also making efforts to cope with increasing demand in that area by establishing joint ventures with 
local manufacturers, mostly in the areas of finishing processes such as tinning plates, electrolytic 
galvanizing and cold rolling sheet products. Such efforts will continue to balance the division of 
work to avoid damage caused by the "hollowing out effect" to the industry. 
As Professor Krugman states in Foreign Affairs, "The newly industrializing countries of 
the Pacific Rim have received a reward of this extraordinary mobilization of resources that is no 
more than what the most boringly conventional economic theory would lead us to expect. If there 
is a secret to Asian growth, it is simply deferred gratification, the willingness to sacrifice current 
satisfaction for future gain. It is, however, perfectly reasonable if growth of East Asia has been 
primarily input driven, and if the capital piling up there is beginning to yield diminishing returns, 
the conventional wisdom about an Asian-centered world economy needs some rethinking." 
Returning to the subject of the first round of direct investment to the United States, we 
find that Japanese steel was one of the major investors in the U.S. steel industry, and NKK was 
one of the pioneers. Why? As you are well aware, the U.S. steel industry has been innovative in 
protecting itself against imports. Since 1989, and spanning more than two decades, a series of 
voluntary restraint agreements and trigger price mechanisms were arranged through government 
intervention. Japanese steel exports to the United States peaked in 1976, and since then have 
been steadily declining due to competition among emerging competitors and yen appreciation. 
We have completely changed our export product mix from commodity grades to value-added 
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niche products which either are not produced or are in short-supply in the market. Recognizing 
that the U.S. market will remain the largest market in the world, we perceived that manufacturing 
in the local market would be the best solution if we were to remain competitive. 
ISfKK has maintained good relations with several U.S. steel companies through 
technological transfer. The U.S. steel industry had difficulty in modernizing equipment and 
technology because of problems raising funds due to weak balance sheets. Several U.S. steel 
companies sought assistance from Japanese steel not only in technology but also through financial 
infusion. Also the steel-intensive auto industry badly needed high quality steel for auto body and 
parts. As a whole, we were convinced we could revitalize the industry by further technological 
transfers and capital commitment. 
Fortunately, Japanese steel was financially healthy at that time and could afford to respond 
favorably to the requests. All major Japanese steel companies committed to various types of 
participation, some through part ownership of the company, others through joint ventures in 
down-stream areas. As a result, our investments are now paying off for the U.S. economy. The 
Big 3 U.S. auto companies, which previously lacked quality materials such as coated sheets to 
manufacture certain critical parts, now have that supply. Over three and a half million tons of 
production capacity for coated sheets has been developed through joint ventures involving Inland, 
National, LTV, USS, AK-Steel and Wheeling-Pittsburgh. 
While there are no official reports on how much money we provided to U.S. steel-making, 
my estimate is that in direct and indirect capital and financial infusion, the amount is probably 
more than $7 billion from 1984 to 1993. John Tumazos, a top steel analyst from the leading 
brokerage firm of Donaldson, Lufkin and Jenrette, estimates about $3 billion in equity and $7.5 
6 
billion in obligations, including mini-mills, which Japanese have assumed. Were it not for those 
investments in the mid-80's, the U.S. auto industry would have faced a serious shortage of coated 
sheets in the last two years, when auto production increased sharply. 
It would appear that our program was successful. But there has been one major problem. 
Our investments did not reduce trade frictions. American mills are continuing to use trade law 
remedies as a major strategy to maintain their domestic markets. 
We think it very ironic that despite our collaboration on investments and technical transfer, 
U.S. mills are vigorously pursuing such a large number of cases, not only again Japan but against 
virtually all imported steel. When the Voluntary Restraint Agreement expired in March 1992, a 
number of trade cases were filed covering perhaps 80% of all finished products, including rail, hot 
and cold rolled sheets, plate, coated sheets, electrical sheets and OCTG. This was done despite 
the fact that Japanese producers only sold 70% of their allotted quota. 
According to one count, 87 suits have been filed. The International Trade Commission 
usually makes a Preliminary Determination, and it almost always is in favor of the plaintiffs since 
less stringent criteria is used than for final determinations. After the preliminary review, 59 cases 
remained. After the final determination, there were 31 positive verdicts. The industry actually 
won much less than half the cases they filed. 
The Japanese steel industry has maintained that American steel's problems are not from 
imports but from a changed supply and demand structure in the United States, which occurred 
during the 1990-1992 recession. Fierce competition from new low-cost mills was one 
development. New technology lowered entry barriers through low capital costs for the capital 
intensive-steel industry. Another was the emergence of steel producers under Chapter 11 
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protection and older mills that were reconstituted by entrepreneurs and also had a lower cost 
structure. Finally, the legacy costs, such as health care and pension expenses for retirees, created 
a substantial burden for the integrated mills. To quote a Government Affairs Manager from 
Caterpillar: "It is clear to Caterpillar that the cause of injury to American integrated steel makers 
is domestic competition, primarily from mini-mills and reconstituted mills." 
To be fair to the big U.S. mills, they have made great efforts to become competitive. But 
these efforts were essential not to compete with imports but to compete for survival against 
domestic mini-mills. Over the past ten years of rationalization, man hour per ton production has 
improved from over 8 hours to just about 5 hours. According to some published reports, this is 
slightly better than Japan and the major European producers. In terms of employee cost per man-
hour, the U.S. industry at about $30 is lower than that of Japanese steel. This has resulted from 
cost-cutting in the United States and the high appreciation of the yen against the dollar. 
Today, the situation is much changed from what it was several years ago. Since 1991, 
U.S. steel shipments have increased to about 15 million tons and reached close to 94.5 million 
tons last year. This is a result of an upturn in the U.S. economy, sparked by strong auto, 
appliances and housing demand. 
The Administration's earlier low-interest policy created a vigorous stock market which 
found steel equities once again attractive. Since the beginning of 1993, well over $5 billion of 
new capital was raised by steel producers through equity in the stock market. Today, the industry 
has returned to profitability, benefiting from strong demand, import protection, its own 
restructuring, and the weak dollar. 
Finished steel production is virtually at 100 percent capacity. In addition, mills have had 
8 
to import over 8 million tons of semi-finished steel from all over the world to meet customers 
requirements. Prices have increased several times over the past two years and further increases 
are expected. Everything appears to be rosy for American steel mills. So what are they looking 
for now? The answer, unfortunately, is more protection. 
The GATT agreement, when implemented by the WTO, is estimated to increase the world 
GDP over the next ten years by 1%, or $230 billion a year, through the elimination of trade 
barriers and tariffs. But, there were many who did not want the new WTO and others who want 
to change U.S. trade law so that it will be more restrictive than the GATT philosophy. Naturally, 
some of these industries are steel and semiconductors. And they have put into U.S. law several 
provisions which expand the probability of finding imports to be traded unfairly in the U.S. 
But thousands of small and medium-sized manufacturers in the United States as well as 
such large companies as GM and IBM have complained about these provisions because they will 
hurt them and restrict their choices. Last year, GM told the ITC that it had to pay much higher 
prices and also found very little off-shore steel available to them because of the trade cases. And 
in February of this year, GM told the Department of Commerce that it should take into 
consideration users and consumers of steel in all trade actions. Industrial users, the company said, 
should be part of the process because they are the ones that suffer. 
Another program in steel trade is called the Multilateral Steel Agreement, MSA. Talks 
have been going on for well over four years. But, thus far, there has been very little progress. 
The purpose of the MSA was to eliminate subsidies and lower tariffs among major steel 
producing countries including the United States, Japan, and the European Union. 
I can only assume that American steel makers would rather take their chances with 
9 
modifying the U.S. trade laws to make them more protective than to go along with the GATT 
consensus to liberalize trade. Our fear is that this type of protectionist push will proliferate 
around the world and further diminish the free trade principles of the new WTO. 
So, as I see it, the strategies pursued by the major American steel mills have paid off. The 
first sought collaboration and alliance with Japanese steel makers for new technology and 
financing, and this is beginning to reap results. At the same time, their restructuring is bringing 
them closer to competing with the emerging mini-mills. Economic growth and financial policy in 
the United States have given them, once again, a favorable stock market for equity financing. 
And finally, they continue to look for trade law remedies as a major strategy in reducing 
competition from abroad and want U.S. laws to be even tougher. 
For the immediate future, the environment looks good for steel in the United States. As 
long as the Federal Reserve keeps interest rates under 6%, domestic GDP will sustain a growth 
rate of between 2 and 3%, and this means steel consumption will remain above 100 million tons -
which will keep the industry operating close to capacity. Imports will continue to be protected by 
the new trade laws as well as the weak dollar. 
U.S. steel users were helped by large amounts of imported semi-finished steel to be 
converted to finished steel in the United States last year. But world-wide economic recovery will 
create less availability of semi-finished steel and this will cause a shortage of steel in the United 
States this year. However, the mini-mill share will continue to grow, especially in the flat-rolled 
area. One mill can now produce a few million tons of sheet and others are constructing plants to 
do likewise. In two years, the minis might control 20% of this lucrative market of flat-rolled 
products compared to nothing six years ago. Serious efforts will be required to enforce balance 
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sheets and to achieve competitiveness against mini-mills and other emerging competitors. 
Let me turn back to Japan. After the collapse of the bubble economy, the economic 
structure has changed from a high growth to a low growth economy, real estate prices have fallen, 
manufacturing has begun to experience a hollowing-out effect, and foreign competition through 
deregulation and the ever-increasing yen has intensified. Under these circumstances, domestic 
steel mill shipments sharply declined from 81 million tons in 1990 to 63.5 million tons in 1994. In 
addition to this decline in production, average domestic prices dropped sharply — about 15% in 
the last two years — to a level even unattractive to NIE'S or Brazilian exporters. In a 
consequence, the five major Japanese steel companies lost 300 billion yen in 1993, compared to a 
270 billion yen profit in 1991. Japanese steel now has no choice but to revise its traditional 
business customs and to change its management style. 
The five major Japanese steel companies have targeted cost reductions totaling 930 billion 
yen in 3 years from 1994. (NKK's target is 175 billion yen). Cost reduction measures include: 
first, reduction of employees eliminating multi-layer management (about 25,000 employees) 
through a 25% cut back of white collar and 20% cutback of blue collar employees relying on 
substantial incentives for early retirement and relocation to subsidiaries; second, cut back of 
capital investment to 30-40% of traditional investment; third, drastic reconsolidation of 
manufacturing plants; and fourth, reconstruction or readjustment of diversified businesses and 
more concentration on core businesses. This is the most drastic restructuring experienced in 
Japan's post-war history. 
While convinced that Japanese steel will once again regain its competitive edge in the 
world market, I am very concerned about the inevitable cutbacks in R&D spending. Japanese 
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steel has been a technological leader over the past two decades, spending 2.5% of its sales on R & 
D compared to 0.5% in the United States. Technological gaps will vanish, and a convergence 
between the technologies of Japan and elsewhere will emerge. 
In this sense, we need continued R&D. In the past, R&D mostly focused on advancement 
of technology and value addition. However, we now have to focus more on the development of 
lower-cost processing. 
Steel industry R&D is expensive - about double per R&D researcher than that of other 
industries (59M yen vs. 26M yen in telecommunications and electronics), and its life cycle is much 
longer. Also, steel R&D requires processing by large-scale, expensive equipment in a high-
temperature environment, which takes substantial capital investments. 
Already, Japanese steel is embarking on some remarkable projects. Kawasaki Steel has 
developed continuous - continuous hot strip rolling, and Sumitomo Metals is now constructing 
new technology seamless pipe manufacturing with a high cross angle piercing mill. On the 
rational level, we are developing a Direct Iron Smelting and Reduction process to replace blast 
furnace and coke oven production. Other steel making processes are being developed to enable 
effective utilization of scraps and energy saving through the use of arc furnaces. In the mini-mill 
area, Japanese steel is behind in the thin-slab casting process where Japanese steel has less 
opportunity to invest in the replacement of existing hot-strip mills. 
Clearly, the realization of R&D results is closely related to investment opportunities. Who 
will be the winner in cokeless iron making, scrap substitution or near net shape melting processes 
is now uncertain. We are confident that after our current restructuring efforts, Japanese steel will 
regain its vitality in technical competitiveness, profitability and development of new products to 
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meet users' demands. 
I will conclude with a few points on trade. First, American steel trade lawyers have made 
a very good living over the past two decades or more promoting what one top integrated steel 
executive calls the trade law remedy approach to import competition. Second, while we have no 
objection to any company filing trade petitions when they feel that a certain country is selling a 
certain product unfairly, American steel makers claim everyone sells everything unfairly. 
I don't think they really believe this, but that's what they say and that's how they file their 
cases. Japan was named in several suits, along with many others. Some we won in the 
preliminary stage, others in the final stage. And we also lost some cases. But we believe the 
process itself is unfair. Our fair shipments suffer for a year or more, and we question the final 
"unfair" determination. We're hoping that this will change. Because if it doesn't, then we will 
see a continuation of charges and counter-charges throughout the world. 
It might be hard for you to believe that while the United States is the largest user of trade 
laws in the world, it also gets charged with more trade law violations than any other single 
country. As the expression goes, "He who lives by the sword dies by the sword." 
Basically, my view is - let's try to get a multilateral steel agreement that's fair and 
equitable, especially now that Russia and Ukraine are pushing exports of steel to the United States 
due to their current excess supply. If the big U.S. mills will not compromise, then the only 
recourse is to have a strong WTO - and to have it supply impartial judgements of what's fair and 
what's not fair. This would be far better than the unilateral approach of American mills using a 
trade law which is becoming more and more restrictive and using procedures set up by the Import 
Administration of the Commerce Department which are biased. These procedures only help those 
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few mills that may win some of the cases. 
Now that steel has become a globalized industry, companies can no longer survive without 
continued rationalization and competitiveness. Everyone has a chance to invest in steel. Japanese 
steel invested in the United States and is now investing is Asian countries, and the U.S. steel 
industry will have more linkages to NAFTA Mexico. 
I hope for a true global economy in steel where American and Japanese manufacturers can 
work together in the fast-growing APEC or elsewhere. I also hope that American steel leaders 
will recognize the internationalization of their industry so that a global consensus on steel trade 
can be established to meet the global economy. This would be far more beneficial than the 
unilateral approaches that have been so common in U.S. trade policy for steel as well as other 
areas. 
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CHART-®: JAPANESE INVESTMENTS IN NORTH AMERICAN STEELMAKING FACILITIES 





Type of products 
('000 tpy) 
Start-up 
1 Integrated operations 
AK SteeJ (1994) (formerly Armco 
SteelCoLP-198&) 
Kawasaki Steel (20), Armco (4) 
Public (76) 





Daido Steel (38), Marubeni (8.4) 
Itochu (8.4), Okaya (8.4) 
Bar, rod (560) Existing operation 
National Steel Corp (1984) NKKfe^) Public (3f) HR, CR, tin plate, coated 
sheet (4,960) 
Existing operation 
USS/Kobe (1989) Kobe Steel (50), USX (50) High quality bar, tube (2,400) Existing operation 
Finishing facilities 
California Steel Industries (1984) Kawasaki Steel (50), CVRD (50) HR, CR galvanized sheet, pipe 
and tube (1,800) 
Existing operation 
DNN (1990) Dofasco Steel (50), NKK (40), 
National Steel (10) 
CG sheet (360) 1993 
l/NTek(1987) Nippon Steel (40), Inland Steel (60) CR sheet (1,000) 1990 
l/N Kote (1989) Nippon Steel (50), Inland Steel (50) HDG sheet (500), EG sheet (400) 1991 
L-S Electro-Galvanizing (1985) Sumitomo Metal (40), LTV Steel (60) EG sheet (400F 1986 
L-S II Electro-Galvanizing (1989) Sumitomo Metal (50), LTV Steel (50) EG sheet'(400) 1991 
Ohio Coating Co (1994) Wheeling-Pittsburgh (45), Dong Yang 
Tinplate (45), Nittetsu Shoji America (10) 
Tinplate (250) 1996e 
Protec Coating (1990) Kobe Steel (50), USX (50) HDG sheet (600) 1993 
Wheeling-Nisshin (1984) Nisshin Steel(64-) 
Wheeling-Pittsburgh(36) 
Aluminized/galvanized sheet (270) 
Galvanized sheet (240) 
1988 
1993 




Auburn Steel (1974) Sumitomo Corp (90), Kyoei Steel (10) Billet, merchant bar (320), SBQ (320) 1975 
Austeel Lemont(1994) Auburn Steel (100) Billet, merchant bar, SBQ, rebar Existing operation 
Arkansas Steel Yamato Kogyo (50), Auburn 
Steel (25), Sumitomo Corp (25) 
Tie plate, flat bar, billet Existing operation 
New CF&I Steel LP (1994) Oregon Steel (85.6), Nippon Steel (9.52) Billet, bar, rail, OCTG (850) Existing operation 
Florida Steel (1992) Kyoei (100) Bar, rod (1,560) Existing operation 
Nucor-Yamato (1987) Yamato Kogyo (49), Nucor (51) Sections (600) 1988 
Tamco Tokyo Steel (100) Rebar, rod (300) Existing operation 
Other 
Cuyahoga Steel 8 Wire Nissho Iwai (50), John Quay (50) Bar (42), wire (18) Existing operation 
Maruichi American (1975) Maruichi (100) Tube/pipe (110) 1976 
Pexco(1992) Sandvik Steel (70), Sumitomo Metals 
(30) 
Stainless tube/pipe (12) 1993 
Western Tube & Conduit Corp 
(1964) 
Sumitomo Metal (95.2), Sumitomo 




Omega Tube & Conduit Western Tube & Conduit (100) ERW 
Sumiden Wire Products Sumitomo Electric (80), Sumitomo Corp 
(20) PC wire/strand stainless wire. 1979 & 1990 
Precision Bar Service Inc (1992) Sumitomo Corp (65), Ogiso Kogyo (35) Pealing, grinding, cutting of SBQ 1992 
J A P A N E S E S T E E L P R O D U C T I O N S U R P A S S E D U. S . 
O U T P U T I N 1 9 8 2 A N D B E Y O N D . 
(MILLION METRIC TONS) 
140 . 
1969 73 82 94 
CHART-®: RAW STEEL PRODUCTION 
U. S . W O R K F O R C E H A S B E E N D R A M A T I C 
A L L Y R E D U C E D . 
(NUMBER IN THOUSAND) 
500 
1975 80 85 90 
CHART-®: NUMBER OF STEEL EMPLOYEES IN U.S.A. 
REMARK: EMPLOYEES OF STEEL DIVISION OF A IS I MEMBER COMPANIES. 
SOURCE: AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL INSTITUTE (A IS I) 
U. S. M I L L S H A V E D R A S T I C A L L Y S H U T 
D O W N O B S O L E T E F A C I L I T I E S . 
(MILLION NET TONS) 
160 
1975 80 85 90 94 
CHART-®: U.S. RA1 STEEL CAPACITY AND PRODUCTION 
SOURCE: AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL INSTITUTE (A IS I ) 
O B S O L E T E F A C I L I T I E S O F O P E N H E A R T H S 
C H A R A C T E R I Z E D T H E O U T - O F - D A T E U. S. 
S T E E L I N D U S T R Y . 
(MILLION NET TONS) 
140 
1975 80 85 90 94 
CHART-©: U.S. RA1 STEEL PRODUCTION BY TYPE OF FURNACE 
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W O R K E R S C U T O V E R H E A D C O S T S . 






9, EMPLOYEES RECEIVING SALARIES 
• EMPLOYEES RECEIVING WAGES 
1975 80 85 90 
CHART-®' : NUMBER OF STEEL EMPLOYEES IN U.S.A. 
93 
REMARK: EMPLOYEES OF STEEL DIVISION OF A IS I MEMBER COMPANIES. 
SOURCE: AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL INSTITUTE (AISI) 
P R O D U C T I V I T Y O F U. S. S T E E L I N D U S T R Y 
H A S C A U G H T U P T O W O R L D C L A S S L E V E L . 
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CHART-®: RAW STEEL TONNES PRODUCED PER STEEL EMPLOYEE 
REMARK: AVARA6ES OF MAJOR U.S. ( 1 4 ) , JAPAN(8) AND E U 0 5 ) STEEL MILLS. 
SOURCE: PAINE 1EBBER, 10RLD STEEL DYNAMICS 
A N D N O W E V E N E Q U A L T O T H E P R O D U C T I V -
I T Y O F J A P A N E S E S T E E L . 
(MAN HOURS PER METRIC TON) 
14 . 
1975 80 85 90 94 
CHART-®: MAN HOURS PER METRIC TON SHIPPED 
SOURCE: PAINE WEBBER, HGRLD STEEL DYNAMICS 
J A P A N E S E S T E E L C O U L D E N J O Y E V E R I N C R E A S I N G 
D O M E S T I C D E M A N D A S W E L L A S B I G O P P O R T U N I T Y 
T O E X P A N D E X P O R T S A L E S UP U N T I L 1 9 8 0 . 







^DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION iiEXPORTS 
1969 73 80 
CHART-®: JAPANESE STEEL DEMAND AND SUPPLY ( 1 9 6 9 - 1 9 8 0 ) 
REMARK: INGOT BASIS 
I N E U R O P E , S T E E L M A K E R S S O U G H T TO 
S O L V E T H E I R P R O B L E M S T H R O U G H J O I N T 
I N V E S T M E N T OR C O L L A B O R A T I O N . 






KRUPP (SECOND LARGEST IN GERMANY) AQUIRES 
24.9% STAKE OF HOESCH (THIRD LARGEST). 





92. 6 CONCLUDE MUTUAL SUPPLY AGREEMENT OF STEEL 
PRODUCTS. 
[USINOR-SACILOR PROVIDES HOOGOVENS OF 150 
THOUSAND TONS OF PLATE, WHILE HOOGOVENS 
PROVIDES USINOR-SACILOR OF 150 THOUSAND TONS 
OF HOT ROLLED COIL ANNUALLY.] 




92. 8 ESTABLISH AVESTA SHEFFIELD TO MERGE THE 













94. 3 ESTABLISH DMV STAINLESS, A NEW HOLDING 
COMPANY FOR THE THREE-WAY MERGER OF THE 
SEAMLESS STAINLESS STEEL TUBE BUSINESSES. 




94. 9 KRUPP HOESCH PURCHASES WHOLE STAKE OF ACCIAI 




- KRUPP HOESCH 
(GERMANY) 
94.10 THYSSEN(LARGEST IN GERMANY) AND KRUPP HOESCH 
(SECOND LARGEST) COMBINE OUTPUT OF TINPLATE 
/ELECTRICAL SHEETS /STAINLESS FLAT PRODUCTS 
IN NEW SINGLE ENTITIES. 
CHART-®: ALLIANCES BETWEEN EUROPEAN STEEL MILLS FOR PROFITABILITY 
S T E E L W O R K F O R C E R E D U C T I O N IN 









1985 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 
CHART-®: I0RKF0BCE OF 5 MAJOR MILLS IN JAPAN AND IN U.S. 
REMARK: STEEL SEGMENT ONLY 
SOURCE: ANNUAL REPORTS / PAINE IEBBER, WORLD STEEL DYNAMICS 
M A J O R J A P A N E S E S T E E L M I L L S D I S P A T C H S O M E O F 
T H E E M P L O Y E E S T O A F F I L I A T E C O M P A N I E S W I T H O U T 





























WORKFORCE DISPATCHED TO 
AFFILIATED COMPANIES 
threof, 5 MAJOR MILLS 
• TOTAL EMPLOYEES 
ACTUAL WORKFORCE 
WORKFORCE DISPATCHED TO 
AFFILIATED COMPANIES 
CHART-®: BREAKDOWN OF EMPLOYEES OF JAPANESE STEEL INDUSTRY 
REMARKS: 1) TOTAL OF BOTH STEEL AND NON-STEEL SEGMENTS 
2) AT THE END OF SEPTEMBER OF EACH YEAR 
SOURCE: JAPAN IRON AND STEEL FEDERATION (JISF) 
F R O M 1 9 8 7 J A P A N S T A R T E D R E C O V E R I N G B Y 
S O - C A L L E D ' B U B B L E E C O N O M Y 1 R E A C H I N G T H E 
P E A K I N 1 9 9 0 . 
(MILLION METRIC TONS) 
1969 73 80 86 
CHART-®: JAPANESE STEEL DEMAND AND SUPPLY ( 1 9 6 9 - 1 9 9 0 ) 
REMARK: INGOT BASIS 
A F T E R J A P A N E S E S T E E L E N J O Y E D S T R O N G D O M E S T I C 
D E M A N D T O W A R D S T H E E N D O F 1 9 9 1 , B U B B L E E C O N O M Y 
C O L L A P S E D S U D D E N L Y . 
(MILLION METRIC TONS) 
1969 73 80 86 
CHART-®: JAPANESE STEEL DEMAND AND SUPPLY (1969-1994) 
90 91 
REMARK: INGOT BASIS 
I N D I R E C T E X P O R T S H A V E B E E N G R A D U A L L Y 
D E C R E A S I N G . 















1975 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 
CHART-®: JAPANESE DOMESTIC ORDINARY STEEL CONSUMPTION AND INDIRECT EXPORTS 
REMARKS: 1) FISCAL YEAR BASIS (APRIL-MARCH) 
2) APPARENT CONSUMPTION OF ORDINARY STEEL M (LEFT-SCALE) 
thereof; INDIRECT EXPORTS B (ditto) 
X OF INDIRECT EXPORTS — (RIGHT-SCALE) 
J A P A N E S E S T E E L E X P O R T I N C R E A S E D 
T O A S I A N C O U N T R I E S . 





SOUTH EAST ASIA 
(EXCL. CHINA) 
1975 80 85 90 
CHART-®: JAPANESE IRON AND STEEL EXPORTS 
U. S. S T E E L I N D U S T R Y H A S B E E N I N N O V A T I V E 
I N P R O T E C T I N G I M P O R T S . 







(MILLION NET TONS) 
120 
% U.S. IMPORTS (LEFT-SCALE) 
— U . S . SHIPMENTS (RIGHT-SCALE) 
100 
o 












[TO 16 COUNTRIES & EC] 
CHART-®: HISTORY OF U.S. STEEL IMPORTS AND MECHANISMS FOR PROTECTION 
REMARK: STEEL MILL PRODUCTS BASIS 
J A P A N E S E S T E E L E X P O R T T O U. S. 
P E A K E D I N 1 9 7 6 A N D S I N C E T H E N 
I T S T E A D I L Y D E C L I N E D . 






1975 80 85 90 94 
CHART-®: U.S. IMPORTS OF STEEL MILL PRODUCTS BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN 
S E R I E S OF Y E N E V A L U A T I O N O V E R W H E L M E D 
J A P A N E S E S T E E L E X P O R T S T O U. S.. 
T 1 1 1 1 1 1 T 
80 8 1 82 B3 84 85 B6 87 88 
CHART-®: COURSE OF YEN EVALUATION 
WE H A V E C O M P L E T E L Y C H A N G E D E X P O R T 
P R O D U C T S M I X F R O M C O M M O D I T Y G R A D E S 
T O V A L U E A D D E D N I T C H E P R O D U C T S . 
(THOUSAND NET TONS) 
8,000 





2 , 0 0 0 
I, 000 
• SEMIS 
• OTHER PRODUCTS 
II WIRE RODS 4 WIRE DRAWN 
« PIPES & TUBES 
OTHER SHEETS & STRIP 
M GALVANIZED SHEETS 
• H.R. SHEETS S STRIP 
M C.R. SHEETS S STRIP 
1976 84 91 92 93 94 
CHART-®: U.S. STEEL IMPORTS FROM JAPAN BY PRODUCTS 
SOURCE: AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL INSTITUTE (A IS I ) 
Major Japanese Automobll Makers' Manufacturing Facilities In North America. 
1 Company Name of Operation Facilities Share (%) Location Capacity Established 
(cars/year) 
TOYOTA Toyota Motor Manufacturing U.S.A. Inc. Toyota 100% Lexington, KY 236,000 1986 
4- being expanded 
to 480.000 
New United Motor Manufacturing Inc. Toyota 50%, G.M. 50% Fremont, CA 312,000 1984 
Toyota Motor Manufacturing Canada Inc. Toyota 100% Cambridge, Ontario 57,000 1986 I 
». 
NISSAN Nissan Motor Manufacturing Corp. U.S.A. Nissan 100% Smyrna, TN 440,000 1980 
* 
IHONDA Honda of America Manufacturing, Inc. Honda 100% Marysville, OH 527,000 1978 I 
Honda of Canada Manufacturing, Inc. Honda 100% Alllston, Ontario 101,000 1984 I 
' • - \ • ' ' • • • - • - • • 
MATSUDA Auto Alliance International Matsuda 50%, Ford 50% Flat Rock, Ml 23C.000 1985 
iMITSUBISHI Diamond-Star Motors Corp. Mitsubishi Group 100% Normal, IL 231,000 1985 I 
1 
i ! IFUJI : ISUZU Subaru Isuzu Automotive Inc. Fuji 51%, Isuzu 49% Lafayette, IN 169,000 1987 
1 SUZUKI CAMI Automotive Inc. Suzuki 50%, G.M. 50% IngersoH, Ontario 205,00^ J 1986 ...J 
t;HAHl (23): MAJOR JAPANESE AUTOMOBIL MAKERS' MANUFACTURING FACILITIES IN NORTH AMFRIHA 
Major Galvanizing Facilities in North America - New Installed Since 1985 
* i 
Company Facilities Capacity Began Operation Joint Venture (Share %) 
(tons per year) 
Armco Steel Co. LP Middletown, OH - #2EGL 300,000 1991 Armco 50%, Kawasaki Steel 50% 
Bethlehem Steel Burns Harbor, IN -- CGL 450,000 1993 
Sparrows Point, MD •- CGL 260,000 1992 
Walbrldge, OH -- EGL 300,000 1993 J/V with Inland Steel 1 
I 
Double G. Coating Jackson, MS -- CGL 260,000 1994 Bethlehem 50%, National 50% 
DNN Galvanizing LP Windsor, Ontario - CGL 400,000 1993 DOFASCO 50%, NKK40%, NSC10% 
I/N KOTE New Carlisle, IN -- CGL 500,000 1992 Inland 50%, Nippon Steel 50% 
New Carlisle, IN -- EGL 400,000 1992 it I 
L.S. Electro Galvaniz ing Cleveland, OH -- EGL 400,000 1986 LTV 60%, Sumitomo Metal 40% I 
L.S.II Electro Galvan iz ing Columbus, OH - #2EGL 360,000 1991 LTV 50%, Sumitomo Metal 50% I 
National Steel Corp. Great Lakes, Ml -• EGL 400,000 1986 Majority owned by NKK 
j 
PROTEC Coating Co. Letpslc, OH - CGL 600,000 1993 USX 50%, Kobe Steel 50% | 
Wheel ing-Nlsshin Inc. Follansbee, WV -- CGL 270,000 1988 Nlsshin 64%, W.P. 36% I 
Follansbee, WV - #2CGL 240,000 1993 
• 
Z-Line Co. Hamilton, Ontario -- CGL 350,000 _ . _ _ _!_991 | STJL0^60%LMltsublshi 40% J 
CHAR! %>: MAJOR GALVANIZING FACILITIES IN NORTH AMERICA 
I N T H E L A S T TWO Y E A R S A U T O P R O D U C T I O N 




(LIGHT AND HEAVY) 
CAR 
1969 73 77 78 
CHART-®: U.S. AUTO PRODUCTION 
SOURCE: lARD'S AUTOMOTIVE 
A M E R I C A N S T E E L ' S P R O B L E M S A R E 
N O T F R O M I M P O R T S B U T F R O M A 
C H A N G E D S U P P L Y S T R U C T U R E . 
(MILLION NET TONS) 
100 




1979 90 E 94 E 2000 
CHART-®: CHANGING SHARE OF THE U.S. MARKET FOR 
MAJOR MILL STEEL PRODUCTS 
REMARK: E = ESTIMATE AS OF MAY, 1994 
SOURCE: PAINE fEBBER, fPRLD STEEL DYNAMICS 
IN T H E P A S T 1 0 Y E A R S , U. S. M A N H O U R 
P E R T O N S H I P P E D H A S I M P R O V E D S H A R P L Y . 
(MAN HOURS PER METRIC TON) 
14 
1975 80 85 90 94 
CHART-® (SAME AS <ft): MAN HOURS PER METRIC TON SHIPPED 
SOURCE: PAINE WEBBER, WORLD STEEL DYNAMICS 
E M P L O Y E E C O S T O F U. S. S T E E L I N D U S T R Y 
IS L O W E R T H A N T H A T O F J A P A N E S E . 
(US$ PER HOUR) 
40 , 
1975 80 85 90 94 
CHART-®: EMPLOYEE COST 
SOURCE: PAINE-IEBBER, WORLD STEEL DYNAMICS 
S I N C E 1 9 9 1 , U. S. S T E E L S H I P M E N T S 
H A V E I N C R E A S E D A B O U T 1 7 M I L L I O N 
T O N S . 
(MILLION NET TONS) 
1990 91 92 93 94 
CHART-30: U.S. STEEL SHIPMENTS (1990-1994) 
-10 
SOURCE: AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL INSTITUTE (A IS I) 
Salomon Brothers Inc 
Unprecedented Market Receptivity to New Issues 
Steel Industry Equity Offerings 1992 -1994 
Date Issuer Security Offered 
Amount 
($ In millions) 
$160.8 
Date Issuer Security Offered 
Amount 
($ In millions) 
$ 326.3 Filed Welrton Steel Common Stock 07/22/93 U.S. Steel Common Steel 
07/10/94 WCI Common Stock 50.0 08/29/93 Wheellng-Ptttsburgh Convertible Preferred Stock 135.0 
03/30/94 AK Sleel Holding Common Slock 412.9 06/29/93 Huntco Ino. Class A Common Stock (IPO) 54.4 
03/28/94 Rouge Steel Class A Common Slock (IPO) 154.0 06/10/93 Northwestern Steel & Wire Common Stock (IPO) 56.0 
03/22/94 Cold Metal Products Common Stock (IPO) 27.7 06/29/93 Shlloh Industries Common Stock (IPO) 36.9 
03/10/94 Olympic Steel Common Stock'(IPO) 62.0 04/08/93 Wheeling-Pittsburgh Shares of Common Stock 86.3 
03/07/94 Bethlehem Steel Common Stock 320.(5 03/23/93 National Steel Class B Common Stock (IPO) 140.0 
02/23/94 Birmingham Steel Common Stock 139.4 02/25/93 Bethlehem Steel 144A Convertible Preferred Stock 250.0 
02/07/94 Webco Industries Common Stock (IPO) 35.0 02/11/93 U.S. Steel Convertible Preferred Stock 300.0 
01/28/94 U.S. Steel Common Stock 184.5 01/26/93 Steel of West Virginia Common Stock 40.0 
12/14/93 JAL Specialty Steel Common Slock (IPO) 218.4 10/01/92 Armco Ino. Convertible Preferred Stock 125.0 
12/10/93 Inland Steel Common Stock 161.3 08/04/92 Bethlehem Steel Common Stock 156.0 
11/23/93 Huntco Ino. Class A Common Stock 45.9 07/21/92 Lukens Inc. Common Stock 54.0 
11/15/93 Schnltzer Steel Class A Common Slock (IPO) 49.5 07/15/92 Inland Steel Industries Common Stock 94.5 
11/11/93 LTV Corporation Common Stock 275.0 07/08/92 Palmer Tube American Depository Receipts 10.5 
11/04/93 Gibraltar Steel Common Stock (IPO) 27.5 08/03/92 U.S. Steel Common Stock 178.5 
10/04/93 Maanshan Iron * Steel American Depository Shares (IPO) 171.9 05/17/92 Quanex Corporation Convertible Exchangeable Preferred Shares 75.0 
09/30/93 Acerlnox, S.A. Common Stock 183.0 04/20/92 China Steel 144A American Depository Shares (IPO) 136.5 
09/29/93 Kentucky Electric Steet Common Stock (IPO) 54.0 03/28/92 Birmingham Steel Common Stock 64.1 
$5,11,4.8 
C H A R T - ® : STEEL INDUSTRY EQUITY OFFERINGS 
Transactions In bold represent those Invoiving Salomon Brothers as managing underwriter. 
Issuance amount does not reflect over-allotment provisions. 
Issuance amount for transactions In negotiation reflect prices as of the last day before filing for seasoned companies and mid-point of 
T O D A Y , T H E U . S . S T E E L I N D U S T R Y R E T U R N E D 
T O P R O F I T A B I L I T Y . 
( b i l l i o n $) 
5 
1979 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 
CHART-32: STEEL SEGMENTS' INCOME BEFORE TAX OF REPORTING COMPANIES TO MSI 
(EXCL. UNUSUAL OR EXTRAORDINARY ITEMS) 
SOURCE: AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL INSTITUTE (A IS I ) 
T H E M I N I - M I L L S H A R E W I L L C O N T I N U E T O G R O W , 
E S P E C I A L L Y I N T H E F L A T - R O L L E D A R E A . 
(MILLION NET TONS) 
® l ) ®n (D2) @2 
(DNUCOR CRAWPORDSVILLE 
(PHASE I 1 . 0 ) (PHASE I 0 . 8 ) 
©NUCOR HICKMANN 
(PHASE I 1.2) (PHASE 11.0) 
©TRICO STEEL (2.2) ®NUC0R SOUTH CAROLINA (1.8) 
©IPSCO (1.0) ©WORLD CLASS STEEL (1.0) 
©STEEL DYNAMICS (PHASE I 1.3) (PHASE I 0.9) 
©BHP/NORTH STAR (PHASE I 1. 5) (PHASE 11.8) 
©ARMCO MANSFIELD (0.8) 
©BETA STEEL (0.6) 
©GALLATIN (PHASE I 1 . 2 ) (PHASE I 0 . 9 ) 
CHART-33: NEf FLAT-ROLLING EAF CAPACITY IN U.S.A. 
D O M E S T I C S T E E L M I L L P R O D U C T S 
S H A R P L Y D E C L I N E D F R O M 1 9 9 1 T O 
1 9 9 4 . 




DOMESTIC CONSUNPTION OF STEEL PRODUCTS 







1990 91 92 93 94 
CHART-34: JAPANESE DOMESTIC DEMAND FOR STEEL PRODUCTS 
(1990~1994T 
REMARK: STEEL PRODUCT BASIS 
SOURCE: INTERNATIONAL IRON AND STEEL INSTITUTE 
-20 
F I V E J A P A N E S E M A J O R M I L L S L O S T 3 0 0 B I L L I O N 
























RECURRING INCOME OF REPORTING COMPANIES TO J I S F 
FIVE MAJOR INTEGRATED 
...MILLS (EXCL, ONE-TIMi.. 
ITEMS) 
1984 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 
CHART-35: RECURRING INCOME OF REPORTING COMPANIES TO JISF 
REMARK: FISCAL YEAR BASIS (APRIL-MARCH) 
SOURCE: JAPAN IRON AND STEEL FEDERATION (JISF) 
91 92 93 E94 
F I V E M A J O R J A P A N E S E S T E E L M I L L S H A V E 
T A R G E T E D T O A C H I E V E C O S T R E D U C T I O N . 
ANNOUNCE 
MENT 
PERSONNEL CUTBACK COST REDUCTION 
(BILLION YEN) 
NIPPON 93.10.29 by FY1996 FY1994-96 
STEEL TOTAL 27,000—20,000 (A7,000) 
WHITE 10,000— 6,000 (A4,000) 
BLUE 17,000—14,000 (A3,000) 
A300 j 
NKK 93. 3.10 by FY1996 
TOTAL 22,200 —19,000 (A3,200) 
STEEL 14,700 —12,100 (A2,600) 
OTHERS 7,500 — 6,900 (A 600) 
FY1994~96 
A175 




94. 8. 9 ANOTHER REVISION 
22,200—16,400 (A5,800) 
KAWASAKI 93. 4.21 by FY1995 
STEEL 
93.12 
TOTAL 13,600—10,700 (A2,900) 
WHITE 3,300-* 2,700 (A 600) 
BLUE 10,300— 8,000 (A2,300) 
REVISION 
TOTAL 13,600—10,300 (A3,300) 
WHITE 3,300-* 2,300 (11,000) 
BLUE 10,300— 8,000 (A2,300) 
94. 5,18 ANOTHER REVISION 
TOTAL 13,600— 8,700 (A4,900) 
WHITE 3,300— 2,300 (A1,000) 
BLUE 10,300— 6,400 (A3,900) 
by FY1995 
A210 
SUMITOMO 93. 3.11 by FY1995 by FY1995 
METAL TOTAL 19,400—16,400 (A3,000) A150 
INDUSTRY WHITE 5,400— 4,600 (A 800) 
BLUE 14,000—11,800 (A2,200) 
94. 3. 8 REVISION 
TOTAL 19,400—15,100 (A4,300) 
WHITE 5,400— 4,100 (Al,300) 




KOBE 93. 6. 1 by FY1995 
STEEL TOTAL 20,100—18,200 (Al,900) 
WHITE 8,500— 7,900 (A 600) 
BLUE 11,600—10,300 (Al,300) 
94. 3. 8 REVISION 
TOTAL 20,100—16,300 (A3,800) 
WHITE 8,500— 7,300 (Al,200) 
BLUE 11,600— 9,000 (A2,600) 
thereof, STEEL DIVIDION 
8,800— 6,700 (A2,100) 
by FY1995 
A100 
CHART-36: PROFITABILITY PROGRAMMES OF MAJOR JAPANESE STEEL MILLS 
J A P A N E S E S T E E L H A S B E E N L E A D E R OF 
T E C H N O L O G I C A L A D V A M C E I N R E C E N T 





1985 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 
CHART-38: R&P EXPENDITURES AND RATIO TO SALES IN JAPANESE STEEL 
REMARK: FISCAL YEAR BASIS (APRIL-MARCH) 
SOURCE: JAPANESE AGENCY OF MANAGEMENT AND COORDINATION 
C U T B A C K OF C A P I T A L I N V E S T M E N T T O 3 0 - 4 0 % 




A 1 , 2 0 0 
800 
JH 4 0 0 
U.S.A. 
(IN~BILL ION DOLLAR) 
o 
1975 80 85 
CHART-37: CAPITAL EXPENDITURE 
90 94 
REMARK: JAPAN - FISCAL YEAR BASIS (APRIL-MARCH) 
U.S.A.- CALENDER YEAR BASIS 
